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Fernando URICOECHEA 
DURKHEEV CONCEPTION OF 
THE RELIGIOUS LIFE CRITIQUE 
article se propose de mettre jour divers points faibles de la théorie 
durkheimienne de la vie religieuse les uns provenant incohérences par rap 
port aux règles méthodologiques que Durkheim avait lui-même posées anté 
rieurement les autres étant dues sa conception rationaliste des sentiments 
et des croyances sociaux Par exemple si on en tient au canon méthodo 
logique des Règles les conclusions des Formes élémentaires ne peuvent en 
aucun cas être généralisées tous les systèmes religieux Par ailleurs sa cri 
tique du naturisme est plus que faible elle est menée partir arguments 
utilitariste Sa propre théorie finit par être elle-même une version socio- 
logique du naturisme Son refus rationaliste de distinguer entre un côté les 
croyances et les valeurs et de autre la connaissance contraint chercher 
la représentation objective des sentiments religieux dans la société elle-même 
De plus la théorie de Durkheim ne intéresse pas vraiment origine du 
sacré mais tout au plus la manière dont le sacré impose la société 
Enfin sa théorie aboutit une impasse la société en laquelle incarne le 
sacré ne peut être ni la société dans son ensemble ni aucun des groupes qui 
la constituent 
El art culo se propone evidenciar diversos puntos conflictivos de la teor 
de Durkheim sobre la vida religiosa Esta con ictividad emana en ciertos ca 
sos de la incoherencia en relaci con las reglas metodol gicas que Durkheim 
hab enunciado anteriormente en otros debido su concepci racionalista 
de los sentimientos de las creencias sociales Por ejemplo si nos circums- 
cribimos los nones metodol gicos de las Reglas las conclusiones de las 
Formas Elementales no pueden ser generalizadas todos los sistemas religio 
sos Por otra parte su cr tica al naturismo es excesivamente simple. es ela 
borada partir de argumentos utilitarios Su propia teor acaba no sdendo 
otra cosa que una versi sociol gica del naturismo Su oposici racionalista 
distinguir entre por un lado las creencias los valores por otro el cono- 
ciminento la squeda de representaciones objetivas de sentimientos religiosos 
en la sociedad Por otra parte la teor de Durkheim no se interesa realmente 
en el origen de la teor de lo sagrado sino en el mejor de los casos en la 
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manera como lo sagrado se impone la sociedad En fin su teor lleva 
un impase la sociedad en la que se encarna lo sagrado no puede ser ni la 
sociedad en su conjunto ni los grupos que la constituyen 
un Ordre la fois idéal et agissant 
Marcel Granet La pensée chinoise 
Introduction 
Of all sociologists who have dealt with the religious life few have ap 
proached it with more religious mood than Emile Durkheim himself In 
effect he discusses religion with the same feeling of reverence as the one 
with which the religious man is assumed to approach it Moreover insofar 
as Durkheim succeeds in conveying the sentiment of sublimity that the sacred 
elicits in us and in simultaneously submitting the sacred to rational and 
scientific discussion he places himself in the Kantian perspective as defined 
in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant 1956 This sensitivity to be ex 
posed to -and the ability to transmit- the sublimity of the religious without 
disregarding the need for its scientific understanding gives singular value to 
reflexions 
The object of this paper is to critically examine central ideas 
concerning the sociology of the religious life as exposed in The Elementary 
Forms of the Religious Life Durkheim 1915 Nevertheless for the reason 
mentioned above it is important to draw attention to the intrinsically limited 
character of any sociological critique of that work As conception 
of social and religious life is profoundly wrought with moral dimension 
which pervades his entire outlook sociological critique is in itself of li 
mited value and may appear as excessive An adequate understanding and 
fair assessment of his thought would have to bring into focus his social phi 
losophy and his authentic moral concern 
On the other hand the theoretical significance and import of The Ele 
mentary Forms transcends the formal limits of the theory of the religious 
life Indeed its relevance not only has to do with his representation of the 
religious as an eminently social fact but also with his conception of 
mind cognitive structure as fundamentally of religious origin The Ele 
mentary Forms should therefore be viewed as containing both sociological 
theory of religion and the rudiments for social epistemology For these rea 
sons the sociological critique advanced here is just one analytical moment 
of task which is inevitably much more vast than we could possibly perform 
now 
Durkheim is at one with Marx and Weber in his rational attempt at de- 
sacralizing the religious world Religious beliefs and practices he will argue 
are possible by virtue of our experience in and of society Society is ultimately 
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accountable for the existence of religion The profane rational and positive 
character of his theory is to be understood in this sense 
And yet contrary to Marx and Weber if there is an apparent secula 
rization of religion there is simultaneously sacralization of society by 
virtue of its religious character How could Durkheim the author of The Rules 
Durkheim 1964 arrive to this vision of society 
Two trends at least concurred to lead him in that direction One of them 
was his sociological reductionism which denied the possibility of conceiving 
the emergence of religious beliefs and sentiments from our experience without 
the collective i.e social experience 
Thus one positive conclusion is arrived at as the result of this critical examination 
Since neither man nor nature have of themselves sacred character they must 
get it from another source Aside from the human individual and the physical 
world there should be some other reality in relation to which this variety of 
delirium which all religion is in sense has significance and an objective va 
lue Durkheim 1915 87-88 my emphases) 
The other trend was his positivist epistemology which encouraged him 
to define cognitive orientation toward external reality exclusively in 
terms of empirical observable data The source of all experience is always 
immediate 
Our entire study rests upon this postulate that the unanimous sentiment of the 
believers of all times cannot be purely illusory Durkeim 1915 417 and Book 
passim) 
Still The Elementary Forms may as well be considered as his less posi 
tivist work This partly reflects the evolution and transformation which his 
thought underwent throughout the years but partly too the nature of the phe 
nomenon under study unlike the other indices he employed -law in The 
Division of Labor in Society Durkheim 1964a) suicide rates in Suicide Dur 
kheim 1951)- religious rituals could not be properly understood without 
substantial consideration of their symbolic functions simply because their 
meaning is not immediaiely apparent 
Primitive religion origin and change 
Durkheim devotes the Introduction of The Elementary Forms chiefly to 
the discussion of two important issues one is the defense of the study of 
primitive religion as theoretically seminal endeavor the other is an analysis 
of the role played by religion in the constitution of our logical categories 
The first issue is the justification of the study of primitive religion as 
representative of any religious system regardless of its degree of complexity 
This thesis is couched in methodological terms The elaborate complexity and 
differentiation of complex religions Durkheim argues makes very difficult 
to distinguish what is secondary from what is principal the essential from 
the accessory 
By contrast these differences and variations are kept to minimum in 
the religious systems of lower societies by virtue of the slack development 
of individuality the small scale of the groups and the homogeneity of the 
environment It is therefore easier he concludes to study primitive religions 
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because their essential elements stand out conspiciously and so do the rela 
tionships among these elements 
Now in so far as all religions are species of the same class 4) all 
of them have the same objective significance and fulfil the same functions 
everywhere whatever the number of outward forms they might eventually 
take It is therefore legitimate to study primitive religious system as 
it serves to show the nature of the religious life just as well as any other 
P.3 
Why are all religious systems species of the same class is something which 
is not justified Supposedly t]hey respond to the same needs they play the 
same role they depend upon the same causes But even accepting 
this statement in this dogmatic form after all that proposition should be 
matter of empirical investigation not an aprioristic postulate the methodo 
logical procedure of this work consisting in exclusively studying one single 
case exhaustively to generalize for other cases cannot be accepted on account 
of own principles of methodology as previously established in 
the Rules 
Consequently to explain social institution belonging to given species one 
will compare its different forms not only among peoples of that species but in 
all preceding species as well. This method which may be called genetic would 
give at once the analysis and the synthesis of the phenomenon For on the one 
hand it would show us the separate elements composing it by the very fact that 
it would allow us to see the process of accretion or action At the same time 
thanks to this wide field of comparison we should be in much better position 
to determine the conditions on which depend their formation Consequently one 
cannot explain social fact of any complexity except by following its complete 
development through all social species Durkheim 1964 138-9 his empha 
sis) 
According to the canon just quoted from the Rules the conclusions of 
The Elementary Forms are alas valid just for Australian systems of religion 
they cannot be therefore generalized to other systems than the primitive Aus 
tralian ones 
On the other hand the study of primitive religion is also defended on 
account of historical method The nature of religion is revealed 
when we get at its roots and this calls for the analysis of its causes the 
analysis of its origin Treading on the hills of theoretical tradition inaugu 
rated by Descartes and followed by Comte Durkheim nevertheless dismisses 
any historical conception of origin in terms of events occurrences accidents 
origin he points out is rather to be understood as the ever-present causes 
upon which the most essential forms of religious thought and practice de 
pend If he chose to study Australian religion it is not because it is 
more original in historical terms which incidentally we might add is 
also correct in the light of its totemie structure but mainly because it is 
structurally morphologic ally more original 
This method could not be employed without affecting theoretical concepts 
related to the idea of history like the notion of change Evolutionism had 
been able to somehow rescue the idea of change despite the de-historicaliza- 
tion of it thanks to the idea of progress In effect change may not according 
to that view fundamentally alter the essence of institutions but it anyway 
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relevant to understand the increasing adaptative capacity that the notion of 
progress conveyed Progress is an enhanced ability to adapt 
Emile Durkheim by contrast refused to accept the idea of progress Under 
those circumstances he removed all relevance from the notion of change If 
the elements essentially constitutive of an institution are already present in 
its most simple social stage the changes to which this institution is sub 
sequently exposed do not add any thing essentially new to it Change is the 
refore essentially insignificant.. 
The second issue which is addressed in the Introduction concerns the role 
played by religion in particular and by the social organization in general 
in the formation of logical categories It is not necessary to get into that 
discussion All would like to say is that Durkheim puts empiricism to task 
with Kantian arguments whereas Kantian rationalism is criticized with socio 
logical postulates Strictly speaking that discussion does not add much to the 
theory to be discussed below 
Once he made clear his rationale for his selection of Australian religion 
Durkheim sets about to elaborate his general theory 
Religion the religious and the sacred 
II un Espace vide là 
où étendue est pas socialisée. 
Marcel Granet La pensée chinoise 
As usual he characteristically begins his book in proposing definition 
of the phenomenon under scrutiny and making very thorough criticism of 
current theories associated with the phenomenon This time he enlarges his 
scope as he deals separately with the idea of the religious and with the concept 
of religion 
With regard to the former he examines those conceptions which associate 
religious phenomena either with the supernatural or with the divinity These 
are easy prey He has no difficulty in showing the inadequacy of the idea of 
divinity as the constitutive characteristic by showing among other things the 
existence of atheist religions 
His attempt to dissociate religious phenomena from the supernatural how 
ever raises some doubts It is possible to identify behind that attempt his 
positivist orientation His point is as follows the idea of the supernatural is 
not primitive Why Because 
to say that certain things are supernatural it is necessary to have the sentiment 
that natural order of things exists that is to say that the phenomena of the 
universe are bound together by necessary relations called laws 26 
This intuition or as he calls it sentiment emerged only with the rise of 
positive science in later stages of civilization 28 Therefore he concludes 
the idea of the supernatural is not essential to religion 
That is striking argument to put it mildly The idea that the conception 
of natural order of things is alone the gradual construction of positive science 
could not be more inaccurate As matter of fact the idea of nature sprang 
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not with positive science but whith philosophy To delay the emergence 
of the notion of necessity to the development of scientific knowledge is to 
say the least excessive Long before the birth of positive science ancient 
cosmogonies revealed the idea of universe subject to necessary laws It is 
moreover quite probable that the opposite was in fact truer namely that 
the conception of natural order was of religious and magical origin This 
seems to square better with the mythical idea of divine entities as agencies 
in the creation of cosmos It is religion that first transformed chaos into 
cosmos Teleology was first traceable to theology as it were 
Having rejected those two conceptions Durkheim then proposes his own 
To him the regulative attribute of the religious is the distinction between the 
sacred and the profane He also identifies interdictions as the indices expres 
sing sacredness Sacred things he will say are those which the inter 
dictions protect and isolate pp 40-41 Interdiction is not however merely 
an appearance of the sacred interdiction bestows the sacred element to the 
definition The social character of the sacred is then quite evident The re 
ligious character of an object is not something inherent in it but instead 
superimposed on it 
This idea is nonetheless at odds with the other idea that sacred things 
differ in nature from profane things... they have wholly different essence 
42 We are first told that the sacred does not inhere in the object and 
later told that sacred objects have different nature Once more it is possible 
to observe unresolved compromise with positivist and rationalist 
orientations Following the empirical procedures of enquiry he first applied 
in The Division of Labor he searches for the indexical observable manifes 
tation of the sacred in the existence of interdictions being at the same time 
led to conceive sacred things as objects essentially different from the profane 
Durkheim does not rest satisfied with the definition of religion simply in 
terms of determinate set of religious beliefs and practices Otherwise magic 
would have to be accepted as religion Characteristically enough he then 
proceeds to look again for distinctively observable attribute expressive of 
the religious He finds it in the church the community which embodies the 
religious set of beliefs and practices 
The construction is elegant and architectonic Actually the same role in 
terdiction plays with regard to the sacred is played by the church with respect 
to the religious system set of interdictions and church can therefore be 
visualized as the theoretical and institutional pillars of the religious life 
The criticism of animism and natiirism 
Dans un monde bien aménagé 
seuls les coins perdus que le 
dais du Ciel ne recouvre pas sont 
les endroits où on laisse subsister 
vaguement les êtres qui ont 
une nature monstrueuse ou divine 
Marcel Granet La pensée chinoise 
Once clarified the issues relative to the idea of the religious his next 
task is to submit to criticism the current conceptions of elementary religion 
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animism and naturism Typically he tries to carry his attack in two different 
ways in the first place by showing the logical inconsistencies and weaknesses 
of those interpretations and in the second place by bringing an empirical 
evidence that contradicts either propositions or consequences logically derived 
from theory 
He first puts animist theory to task for its conception of religious phe 
nomena as merely hallucinatory representations with no objective foundation 
For Durkheim of course religious phenomena express an objective reality 
Otherwise he remarks it would be inconceivable to explain how has this 
extraordinary dupery been able to perpetuate itself all through the course of 
history 70 Then he brings in some nice pieces of empirical evidence 
that refute animist theory 
But if Durkheim had no pain in shattering to pieces animism his criticism 
of naturism is by contrast weak It is interesting that he is at loss to find 
empirical evidence to refute the theory The only piece looking like an em 
pirical attack on naturism is timidly presented in the concluding paragraph 
of the chapter devoted to that critique It reads 
Finally if the objects of nature really became sacred because of their imposing 
forms or the forces which they manifest then the sun the moon the sky the 
mountains the sea the winds in word the great cosmic powers should have 
been the first to be raised to this dignity for there are no others more fitted to 
appeal to the senses and the imagination But as matter of fact they were di 
vinized but slowly The first beings to which the cult is addressed. are humble 
vegetables and animals in relation to which men could at least claim an equality 
they are ducks rabbits kangaroos lizards worms frogs etc Their objective qua 
lities surely were not the origin of the religious sentiments which they inspired 
86) 
It should be bom in mind that the objects of worship that should first 
call our attention are those arbitrarily chosen by Durkheim himself Neither 
these objects nor the hierarchy of dignity the sun the moon etc. which 
he constructs derive necessarily from the propositions of naturism cannot 
see just why frogs for instance are less fitted to appeal to the senses and 
the imagination of the primitive man That is sheer ethnocentrism 
How does Durkheim go about to criticize naturism in logical theoretical 
terms He starts by acknowledging that naturism is in principle founded on 
our sensory experience on our perception of nature However language plays 
trick with these perceptions and transforms them into an illusory system of 
hallucinations that strips naturism of its originally sound basis Language 
alone gives life to those creations of our mind The objection is adequate 
But naturism also claims he adds that religion springs from our need to 
know the world in which we live If we have need of knowing the nature 
of things as that theory holds] it is in order to act upon them in an appro 
priate manner 79 my emphasis Now the conceptions of things he 
continues given us by religion and particularly its elementary types are ut 
terly impractical for this purpose We must therefore he adds conclude that 
the reason for the existence of religion has nothing to do with the above 
mentioned need The constant failures of religion with regard to the satisfac 
tion of such need would quickly show indeed the practical inadequacy of 
religion 
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It is perplexing and ironical that Durkheim the staunch enemy of utili 
tarianism would attack naturism with such an utilitarian argument When Dur 
kheim looks at religious experience and religious beliefs from an instrumental 
point of view and when he likewise looks for the source of religious values 
in our desire to have rational control of the external world he can be put 
to task for the same reason as the one that led him in The Division of Labor 
in Society to consider interest and by extension utility poor explanatory 
category 
There is nothing less constant than interest Today it unites me to you tomor 
row it well make me your enemy Such cause can only give rise to transient 
relations and passing associations. 1964a 204) 
Still the weakness of the above argument does not only rest upon its 
lack of sociological sophistication but also upon the premise which supports 
it That premise is in fact questionable to the extent that not all types of 
knowledge aim at getting at the nature of things in order to act upon them 
The idea of control through knowledge i.e the Greek episteme has an emi 
nently scientific and originally magic origin but is by no means shared 
by all types of knowledge Religious and philosophical varieties of knowledge 
are not primarily concerned with the goal of control as the ultimate justifi 
cation of knowledge Those varieties are of so to speak disinterested kind 
and are better grasped by means of the classical notion of gnosis Religious 
knowledge and by extension religions cannot be judged on the basis of their 
efficacy for control as the criterium of their survival 
pragmatic insistence on the efficacy of knowledge is account 
able in terms of his naturalistic epistemology which is incapable of making 
the phenomenologically crucial distinction between perception of things and 
perception of expressions This distinction is crucial if one wishes to grasp 
the uniqueness of cultural concepts as opposed to naturalistic concepts Phe- 
nomenological analysis as well as child psychology have shown moreover 
the genetical primacy of the perception of expressions rooted in myth af 
fection and the ego vis vis the perception of things rooted in science 
measurement and the object- both for society and the child Cassirer 1957 
Part chap passim and Cassirer 1960 chap passim In any event 
Cassirer remarks immersion in the phenomenon of perception shows us one 
thing that the perception of life is not exhausted by the mere perception of 
things that the experience of the thou can never be dissolved into an ex 
perience of the mere or reduced to it even by the most complex conceptual 
mediations Even from purely genetic standpoint there seems to be no doubt 
to which of the two forms of perception we should accord priority The farther 
back we trace perception the greater becomes the preeminence of the thou 
form over the it form and the more plainly the purely expressive character 
takes precedence over the matter or thing-character The understanding of ex 
pression is essentially earlier than the knowledge of things. Cassirer 1957 
62-63) 
equation of knowledge beliefs and values 
It follows that inability to draw clear distinction between 
knowledge on the one hand and beliefs and values on the other account for 
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his mistaken interpretation of the religious experience But why after all 
is it so fatal to assimilate beliefs and values to knowledge For several 
reasons 
From sociological standpoint to identify beliefs and values with know 
ledge means that our system of action and orientation toward the world takes 
on distinctively cognitive rational character There is no one single social 
theory which would sensibly accept this ideal and extreme position We al 
ready saw its inappropriateness to attack naturism 
Another consequence of great importance for the construction of his theory 
of religion was that in identifying knowledge i.e positive knowledge as 
here understood with evaluative and normative ideas and beliefs he was 
forced to demand from these ideas and beliefs an empirical basis Our entire 
study rests upon this postulate that the unanimous sentiment of the believers 
of all times cannot be purely illusory. 417 This demand for equiva 
lence of ideas to observable reality illustrates quite well his position Hence 
he applies to beliefs and ideas the criterium of validity characteristic of scien 
tific knowledge the correspondence between the mental representation 
and the objective external thing represented 
Inescapably then all representations should have for Durkheim an em 
pirical observable reference No wonder then that he was compelled to trans 
form society into the object of religious representations See above It is 
clear then how his sociological reductionism together with his epistemology 
led him to consider society as the ground and principle of our religious ex 
perience Cf 418 and passim. 
But the correspondence between the object and its representation may 
be necessary in the field of empirical knowledge alone It is by no means 
necessarily so in other provinces like in our case the religious In effect 
the problem of the validity of our knowledge the question of the relationship 
between our ideas and the objective world is central for scientific knowledge 
for obvious reasons Phenomenological and religious knowledge tolerate and 
admit the coexistence of several representations of the same object Again 
and by contrast the role of tradition authority revelation and faith as sources 
of evidence are central for religious thought yet they are logically irrelevant 
for scientific ideas Durkheim failed to realize that the nature and the functions 
of these different types of cognition are not uniform They are not that is 
species of the same class .. 
However paradoxical it may seem theory of religion is ba 
sically sociological version of naturism He commits the same mistake as 
the one he attributed to that school with respect to the origin of the idea of 
the sacred In fact according to naturism objects become sacred because 
of their imposing forms or the forces which they manifest 86 And what 
is so sacred or religious about society How is it transformed into 
sacred object anyway The answer echoes from his early writings because 
of its binding imperative moral force Religious forces are therefore human 
forces moral forces 49 Or even better 
Since it is in spiritual ways that social pressure exercises itself it could not fail 
to give men the idea that outside themselves there exist one or several powers 
both moral and at the same time efficacious upon which they depend ... As 
long as scientific analysis does not come to teach it to them men know well that 
they are acted upon but they do not know by whom So they must invent by 
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themselves the idea of these powers with which they feel themselves in connection 
and from that we are able to catch glimpse of the way by which they were 
led to represent them under forms that are really foreign to their nature and to 
transfigure them by thought 209 
Thus society too becomes sacred object by manifesting its moral 
force by the constraint it imposes upon us The difference between the na 
turist interpretation and his own is matter of object not of mechanism 
Substitute society for natural powers and we arrive likewise at the origin 
of religious sentiments In both cases the origin is an external force which 
arouses these sentiments 
The emergence of the sacred 
on ne con oit pas de dieux 
qui soient étrangers aux hommes 
qui aient une autre essence que la leur 
Univers est un 
Marcel Granet La pensée chinoise 
But just why society awakes in us this sentiment Why should this force 
become source of religious awe whereas physical forces do not Because 
we entertain for them feeling of respect which physical forces do not inspire 
212 and passim That is all right The moral forces of society have an 
unquestionable ascendancy which elicit our respect in sense that frogs and 
stars do not 
Still how does it come that this respect is transformed into worship 
How does in other words the sentiment of the sacred appear Because it 
is quite admissible to agree with Durkheim in all the steps traced thus far in 
according moral force to society without ending up worshipping it Whence 
comes the sacred answer is found in page 206 
Thus the totem is before all symbol material expression of something else 
But of what 
... In the first place it is the outward and visible form of what we have called 
the totemie principle or god But it is also the symbol of the determined society 
called the clan ... So if it is at once the symbol of the god and of the society 
is that not because the god and the society are only one How could the emblem 
of the group have been able to become the figure of this quasi-divinity if the 
group and the divinity were two distinct realities The god of the clan the totemie 
principle can therefore be nothing else than the clan itself personified and rep 
resented to the imagination under the visible form of the animal or vegetable 
which serves as totem 
But how has this apotheosis been possible and how did it happen to take place 
in this fashion 
In general way it is unquestionable that society has all that is necessary to 
arouse the sensation of the divine in minds merely by the power that it has over 
them for to its members it is what god is to his worshippers In fact god 
is first of all being whom men think of as superior to themselves and upon 
whom they feel that they depend ... Now society also gives us the sensation 
of perpetual dependence My emphases) 
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answer is as ingenious as it is fallacious if symbol stands 
for two objects then the two objects are the same. Moreover he also 
attributes this sacred character to society on account of the analogy he finds 
between our attitudes towards it and the attitude towards his god as 
the religious attitude of the believer towards his god is analogous to our at 
titude towards society we must then conclude that society arouses in us 
sacred sentiment In both cases furthermore we experience sensation of 
dependence and in both cases we submit ourselves to privation and sacrifice 
p.207) 
But just because there is such an analogy it does not follow that society 
is transformed into sacred object or likewise that in both cases the object 
is the same An analogy does not have the force of necessary inference or 
the force of fact 
All the same the weakest point of the analogy of Durkheim is the cir 
cularity of his reasoning In effect in order to account for the explicandum 
he has previously taken for granted the existence of the sacred Therefore 
his theory could at best be defined as an interpretation of how the idea of 
the sacred is superimposed upon society and not as an interpretation about 
the genesis or the source of that idea At bottom the he begs the question 
of the origin of the sacred insofar as one of the premisses of the thesis is 
that the sacred already exists for the believer that the totemie emblem is the 
symbol of the god He then proceeds to describe why he thinks that god and 
society are symbolically the same And this to conclude is again to take 
the explicandum as an element in the explanation 
But even if for the sake of argument we accept provisionally 
thesis it still seems to present some difficulties in fitting it within his own 
general sociology Specifically how is this society of which he speaks to be 
identified As concret social group the family the local community the 
nation state etc or as the idea of society i.e society in abstracto 
It is apparent that Durkheim did not mean the first alternative Indeed 
our social life he would say is not exhausted in any of these groups all of 
them have share in our moral existence and therefore all of them contri 
bute to instill in us the sentiments of dependence respect and veneration so 
necessary for the emergence of these sentiments Not anyone of these groups 
by itself could be accountable for the birth of these lofty sentiments 
We are so left with the second alternative our object of religious cult 
is society in abstracto the idea of society But then it is necessary to face 
some difficulties in the light of his own sociology religious sentiments at 
bottom spring from our dependence from society and from the moral force 
it exerts over us And these dependence and force come into being as the 
result of the action of concrete groups as it is manifested by social sanctions 
Why Just because all moral facts consist in rule of sanctioned conduct 
Durkheim 1964a 425 also 435 ibidem my emphasis Group sanctions 
then help create this sentiment of dependence and veneration Ultimately 
we end up he insisted continuously loving this authority. But the idea of 
society has no moral force it has not of itself capacity for sanctioning 
Uricoechea 1979 Consequently society as an idea as representation can 
not possibly be religious object 
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Thus formulated there is no exit to this contradiction in terms of his own 
sociological theory And yet there is Gordian solution available for Durkheim 
in the way read him But this as suggested at the beginning of this paper 
is moral exit so genuinely Durkheimian. after all 
Femando URICOECHEA 
National University of California 
NOTES 
In very fundamental way the concept of social fact which appears in The Rules 
anticipates for many years the religious conception of society of The Elementary Forms Both 
works share the conception that the collective experience associated with the group is nothing 
but intense Our obedience to social norms and our religious sentiments are both grounded upon 
the moral authority the group the social gains over individual consciences That each indi 
vidual consciousness echoes the collective sentiment ... by virtue of the special energy resident 
in its collective origin Durkheim 1964 is central proposition for both theoretical pers 
pectives 
It is true that in The Rules he identifies the source or the substratum of the social in 
either the political society as whole or some one of the partial groups it includes such as 
religious denominations political literary and occupational associations etc Durkheim 1964 
All the same the sentiment of the social is necessary not sufficient condition for the 
emergence of socially qualified sentiment like the religious In other words the social is just 
the foundation of the religious without which the latter could not possibly arise but something 
else is required for its coming into being Furthermore the totemie principle or god is associated 
with determined society as whole not with fraction thereof 
REFERENCES BIBLIOGRAPHIQUES 
CASSIRER Ernst 1957 The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms vol iii The Phenomenology of Knowledge New Haven and London Yale University Press
1960 The Logic of the Humanities New Haven and London Yale University Press 
DURKHEIM Emile 1915 The Elementary Forms of The Religious Life London George Alien 
Unwin 
1951 Suicide Study in Sociology New York The Free Press 
1964 The Rules of Sociological Method New York The Free Press 
1964a The Division of Labor in Society New York The Free Press 
KANT Immanuel 1956 Critique of Practical Reason Indianapolis New York The Bobbs- 
Merrill Co 
URICOECHEA Fernando 1979 La Théorie de la solidarité de Durkheim Une Critique Ca 
hiers Internationaux de Sociologie Paris vol LXVI 
166 
